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uring the next quarter century the world
will produce enough food to meet the
demand of people who can afford to buy it,
and real food prices will continue to decline.
H o w e v e r, if the global community continues
with business as usual, prospects for food
security will be bleak for millions of people
and degradation of natural resources will
continue. IFPRI projections suggest that in
developing countries as many as 150 million
children—one out of four preschool children—
could remain malnourished in 2020. In many
developing countries food production is
unlikely to keep pace with increases in the
demand for food by growing populations.
The “food gap”—the difference between pro-
duction and demand for food—could more
than double in the developing world during
the next 25 years, increasing dependence
on imports from developed countries. For
those countries with sufficient foreign curren-
cy reserves, including the rapidly growing
Asian countries, this should not be cause for
alarm. However, many low-income countries,
including most of those in Sub-Saharan
Africa, will not be able to generate the nec-
essary foreign exchange to purchase need-
ed food on the world market. And many poor
people within these countries will not be able
to afford the food to fully meet their needs.
Humanity is entering an era of volatility in
the world food situation. Several factors have
emerged that could lead to larger fluctuations
in food availability and access in various
regions and countries around the world, mak-
ing the poor even more vulnerable to hunger.
These factors include low grain stocks and
declining food aid, which have reduced a key
b u ffer at times of food shortages; growing
scarcity of water, which is likely to reduce
availability for agricultural uses; weather fluc-
tuations such as those induced by El Niño
and global warming, which affect production
in hard-to-predict ways; and civil strife and
political and social instability, which are both
a cause and a result of hunger.
Policymakers, researchers, and others
must take proactive steps to minimize uncer-
tainty in the future world food situation in
order to achieve food security for all people.
In developing countries, policymakers need
to ensure that their policies promote broad-
based economic growth, especially agricul-
tural growth, so their countries can produce
enough food to feed themselves or enough
income to buy the necessary food on the
world market. Policymakers in developed
countries should consider reversing the
decline in aid flows and redirecting aid to the
most vulnerable developing countries. A
world of food-secure people is within our
reach, if we take the necessary actions.
This report is taken from a presentation
made at the October 1997 International
Centers Week meeting of the Consultative
Group on International Agricultural Research
(CGIAR). Every two years the CGIAR invites
the director general of IFPRI to present an
assessment of the world food situation to
those gathered for International Centers
Week. This report comes out of ongoing
IFPRI research and activities conducted as
part of the 2020 Vision for Food, A g r i c u l t u r e ,
and the Environment initiative, which aims to
generate information to eradicate hunger,
prevent poverty, and protect the environment.
The authors would like to thank Raisuddin
Ahmed, Christopher Delgado, Peter Hazell,
and Sherman Robinson for useful comments
and suggestions; Heidi Fritschel for valuable
editing assistance; and Vicki Lee for excellent
word processing and graphics assistance. Spe-
cial thanks are due to Mercedita A. Sombilla,
who was instrumental in the development of
the IMPA C T model and was responsible for
running alternative scenarios for this report,
and Claudia Ringler, whose careful and con-
structive reviews strengthened the report.7
INTRODUCTION
I
n the past couple of years, developments
in global food supply, demand, and trade
have raised concerns about the world’s
future food supply. The prices of wheat and
maize rose rapidly during 1995 and the first
half of 1996, and at the same time global
cereal stocks fell sharply. China’s net
imports of grain increased substantially in
1995 following two years of net exports.
Many of the countries of Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union failed to make sig-
nificant advances in economic transition and
agricultural development, and flows of food
aid and official development finance to
developing countries declined. The recent
reemergence of El Niño is affecting tempera-
ture and rainfall patterns around the world
and could have potentially severe implica-
tions for food security.
Other developments, however, have
o ffered glimmers of hope. The United
Nations (UN) once again revised its popula-
tion projections downward, thus reducing
expected pressures on future food supplies.
Although official development finance contin-
ued to decline, private capital flows to devel-
oping countries increased substantially.
Progress was made on international trade
liberalization along the lines suggested by
the Uruguay Round of the General A g r e e-
ment on Ta r i ffs and Trade (GATT). T h e
World Food Summit convened by the Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO) in November 1996 raised
awareness of world food security problems
and stimulated commitments for action.
The outlook for the future world food situ-
ation will also be significantly influenced by a
number of emerging issues. Dietary patterns
are changing rapidly in many countries in
response to income increases, urbanization,
changing preferences, and government poli-
c y. Rapid urbanization in low-income devel-
oping countries is placing increasing stress
on food marketing and processing systems.
Growing scarcity and inappropriate alloca-
tion of water, as well as declining soil fertility
in many regions of the world, are beginning
to constrain food production. Farm yields in
parts of Asia are approaching economically
optimum levels, and yield growth rates are
slowing. 
The policy-induced slowdown in grain
production and drawdown of cereal stocks in
North America and Western Europe, com-
bined with greater variability in agricultural
production caused by weather changes,
such as those induced by El Niño, are likely
to cause greater food price swings in the
future. While science, including bioengineer-
ing and other modern scientific methods,
o ffers tremendous opportunities for reducing
production fluctuations and increasing pro-
ductivity on small-scale farms in developing
countries, little investment is being made in
research aimed at these farms. Develop-
ments in China and India are of particular
interest because policy decisions made, or
not made, in these countries are likely to
a ffect not only large populations in these
countries themselves, but also the rest of the
world. Future food production in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union remains
uncertain, and Sub-Saharan Africa faces a
precarious food security situation. Wi d e-
spread conflict and instability are further
adding to food insecurity in a number of
countries. 
All of these issues suggest potentially
larger fluctuations in food production and
prices, and higher associated risks of food
insecurity for the world’s most vulnerable
countries and people. The challenge for poli-
cymakers, researchers, and others is how
best to minimize these risks to achieve food
security for all people.
This report presents the authors’ b e s t
assessment of prospects for global food
security over the next quarter century, draw-
ing upon recently revised and updated infor-8
PROSPECTS FOR GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY
P
rojections of food production and con-
sumption to the year 2020 offer some
signs of progress, but prospects of a food-
secure world—a world in which each and
every person is assured of access at all
times to the food required to lead a healthy
and productive life—remain bleak if the glob-
al community continues with business as
usual. IFPRI’s revised and updated global
model, the International Model for Policy
Analysis of Commodities and Tr a d e
( I M PA C T ) ,1 projects the future world food sit-
uation under several scenarios. Under the
most likely or baseline scenario, 150 million
children under the age of six years will be
malnourished in 2020, just 20 percent fewer
than in 1993 (Figure 1).2 One out of every
four children will be malnourished in 2020,
down from 33 percent in 1993. Child malnu-
trition is expected to decline in all major
developing regions except Sub-Saharan
Africa, where the number of malnourished
children could increase by 45 percent
between 1993 and 2020 to reach 40 million.
In South Asia, home to half of the world’s
malnourished children in 1993, the number
of malnourished children is projected to
decline by more than 30 million between
1993 and 2020, but the incidence of malnu-
trition is so high that, even with this reduc-
tion, two out of five children could remain
malnourished in 2020 (Figure 2). With more
than 70 percent of the world’s malnourished
children, Sub-Saharan Africa and South A s i a
are expected to remain “hot spots” of child
malnutrition in 2020. 
Projections by FAO on the number of
food-insecure people paint a similarly mixed
p i c t u r e .3 FAO projects that 680 million 
people, 12 percent of the developing world’s
population, could be food insecure in 2010,
down from 840 million in 1990–92 (Figure 3).
mation from IFPRI’s global food model,
which projects food demand, supply, and
trade to the year 2020. It reviews recent
events that have significantly influenced food
security as well as key emerging issues that
have the potential to significantly affect food
security in the coming years. The report also
analyzes the implications of these recent
events and emerging issues for agricultural
research and food policy reform in develop-
ing countries.
Figure 1—Number of malnourished children,
1993, 2010, and 2020
Source:  IFPRI IMPACT simulations.
Figure 2—Percentage of malnourished 
children, 1993, 2010, and 2020
Source:  IFPRI IMPACT simulations.9
Food insecurity is expected to diminish
rapidly in East Asia and, to a lesser extent, 
in South Asia and Latin America, but it could
accelerate substantially in Sub-Saharan
Africa and West Asia and North Africa. Sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia, home to a
projected 70 percent of the world’s food-
insecure people in 2010, will be the locus of
hunger in the developing world. In fact, Sub-
Saharan A f r i c a ’s share of the world’s food-
insecure population is projected to almost
quadruple between 1969–71 and 2010 from
11 to 39 percent.4 By 2010, every 3rd person
in Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to be food
insecure compared with every 8th person in
South Asia and every 20th person in East
Asia. These disturbing figures reflect wide-
spread poverty and poor health.
Worldwide, per capita availability of food
is projected to increase around 7 percent
between 1993 and 2020, from about 2,700
calories per person per day in 1993 to about
2,900 calories. Increases in average per
capita food availability are expected in all
major regions. China and East Asia are pro-
jected to experience the largest increase,
and West Asia and North Africa the smallest
(Figure 4). The projected average availability
of about 2,300 calories per person per day in
Sub-Saharan Africa is just barely above the
minimum required for a healthy and produc-
tive life. Since available food is not equally
distributed to all, a large proportion of the
r e g i o n ’s population is likely to have access
to less food than needed. 
Related to this is an increasing gap
between food demand and production in sev-
eral parts of the world. Demand for food is
influenced by a number of forces, including
population growth and movements, income
levels and economic growth, human
resource development, and lifestyles and
preferences. In the next several decades,
population growth will contribute to increased
demand for food. The United Nations recent-
ly scaled back its population projections, but
even with these reduced estimates, almost
80 million people are likely to be added to the
w o r l d ’s population each year during the next
quarter century, increasing world population
by 35 percent from 5.69 billion in 1995 to
7.67 billion by 2020.5 More than 95 percent
of the population increase is expected in
developing countries, whose share of global
population is projected to increase from 79
percent in 1995 to 84 percent in 2020. Over
this period, the absolute population increase
will be highest in Asia, but the relative
increase will be greatest in Sub-Saharan
Africa, where the population is expected to
almost double by 2020 (Figure 5). 
At the same time, urbanization will con-
Figure 3—Number of food-insecure people,
1990–92 and 2010
Source:  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, Food, Agriculture, and Food Security: Develop-
ments since the World Food Conference and Prospects,
World Food Summit Technical Background Document 1
(Rome, 1996).
Figure 4—Daily per capita calorie availability,
1993 and 2020
Source:  IFPRI IMPACT simulations.10
tribute to changes in the types of food
demanded. Much of the population increase
in developing countries is expected in the
cities; the developing world’s urban popula-
tion is projected to double over the next
quarter century to 3.6 billion.6 U r b a n i z a t i o n
profoundly affects dietary and food demand
patterns: the increasing opportunity cost of
w o m e n ’s time, changes in food preferences
caused by changing lifestyles, and changes
in relative prices associated with rural-urban
migration lead to more diversified diets with
shifts from basic staples such as sorghum,
millet, and maize to other cereals such as
rice and wheat that require less preparation
and to milk and livestock products, fruits and
vegetables, and processed foods. 
P e o p l e ’s access to food depends on
income. Currently, more than 1.3 billion peo-
ple are absolutely poor, with incomes of a
dollar a day or less per person, while another
2 billion people are only marginally better
o ff .7 Income growth rates have varied consid-
erably between regions in recent years, with
Sub-Saharan Africa and West Asia and 
North Africa struggling with negative growth
rates while East Asia was experiencing 
annual growth rates exceeding 7 percent.8
Prospects for economic growth during the
next quarter century appear favorable, with
global income growth projected to average
2.7 percent per year between 1993 and 2020
(Figure 6). The projected income growth
rates for developing countries as a group are
almost double those for developed countries.
Growth rates are projected to be lowest in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
Even Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to
experience positive per capita income growth
between 1993 and 2020, although it will be
quite low. However, unless significant and
fundamental changes occur in many devel-
oping countries, disparities in income levels
and growth rates both between and within
countries are likely to persist, and poverty is
likely to remain entrenched in South Asia and
Latin America and to increase considerably in
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Under the baseline scenario, IMPA C T
projects global demand for cereals to
increase by 41 percent between 1993 and
2020 to reach 2,490 million metric tons, for
meat demand to increase by 63 percent to
306 million tons, and for roots and tubers
demand to increase by 40 percent to 855
million tons (Figure 7).9 Most of the increas-
es in demand between 1993 and 2020 are
projected to occur in developing countries,
which will account for more than 80 percent
of the increase in global cereal demand,
nearly 90 percent of the increase in meat
demand, and more than 90 percent of the
increase in demand for roots and tubers.
Figure 5—Absolute and relative population
increases, 1995–2020
Source:  United Nations, World Population Prospects: The
1996 Revisions (New York, 1996).
Note: Medium-variant projections.
Figure 6—Projected average annual income
growth rates, 1993–2020
Source:  IFPRI IMPACT simulations.11
Among the major developing regions, Sub-
Saharan Africa is expected to experience the
largest percentage increase in demand for
all the major food commodities, albeit from
low levels (Figure 8).
Demand for cereals for feeding livestock
will increase considerably in importance in
coming decades, especially in developing
countries, in response to strong demand for
livestock products. Between 1993 and 2020,
developing countries’ demand for cereals for
animal feed is projected to double while
demand for cereals for food for direct human
consumption is projected to increase by 47
percent (Figure 9). By 2020, 24 percent of
the cereal demand in developing countries
will be for feed, compared with 19 percent in
1993. However, in absolute terms, the
increase in cereal demand for food will be
higher than for feed. In developed countries,
the increase in cereal demand for feed will
outstrip the increase in cereal demand for
food in both absolute and relative terms. 
Because of substantial increases in
demand for livestock products, especially in
developing countries where primarily maize
and other coarse grains are used for animal
feed, demand for maize is projected to
increase faster than for other cereals in 
both developed and developing countries
(Figure 10). Global demand for maize is pro-
jected to grow at an annual rate of 1.4 per-
cent between 1993 and 2020, followed by
wheat at 1.3 percent and rice at 1.2 percent.
In China and India, for instance, demand for
maize and other grains for feed is projected
to increase by around 3 percent per year
between 1993 and 2020.
How will the expected increases in cereal
demand be met? Not by expansion in culti-
vated area. IMPA C T projections indicate that
the area under cereals will increase by only
5.5 percent or 39 million hectares between
1993 and 2020, almost two-thirds of which
will be in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since growth
Figure 7—Increase in total demand for
cereals, meats, and roots and
tubers, 1993–2020
Source:  IFPRI IMPACT simulations.
Figure 8—Increase in total demand for
cereals, meats, and roots and
tubers in major developing
regions, 1993–2020
Source:  IFPRI IMPACT simulations.
Figure 9—Absolute and relative increase in
food and feed demand for cereals,
1993–2020
Source:  IFPRI IMPACT simulations.12
in cultivated area is unlikely to contribute
much to future production growth, the burden
of meeting increased demand for cereal rests
on improvements in crop yields. However,
the annual increase in yields of the major
cereals is projected to slow down during
1993–2020 in both developed and develop-
ing countries (Figure 11). This is worrisome
given that yield growth rates were already on
the decline. Two of the key reasons for slow
cereal yield growth rates are: 
1. In regions where input use is high,
such as Asia, farmers are approaching
economically optimum yield levels,
making it more difficult to sustain the
same rates of yield gains. 
2. Declining world cereal prices are
causing farmers to switch from cere-
als to other, more profitable crops and
are causing governments to slow their
investment in agricultural research
and irrigation and other infrastructure. 
With the projected slowdowns in area
expansion and yield growth, cereal produc-
tion in developing countries as a group is
also forecast to slow to an annual rate of 1.5
percent during 1993–2020 compared with
2.3 percent during 1982–94. This figure is
still higher, however, than the 1.0 percent
annual rate of growth projected for devel-
oped countries during 1993–2020. 
Cereal production in developing coun-
tries will be insufficient to meet the expected
increase in demand. As a group, developing
countries are projected to more than double
their net imports of cereals (the diff e r e n c e
between demand and production) between
1993 and 2020 (Figure 12). With the excep-
tion of Latin America, all major developing
regions are projected to increase their net
cereal imports: the quadrupling of A s i a ’s 
net imports will be driven primarily by rapid
income growth, while the 150 percent
increase forecast for Sub-Saharan Africa will
be driven primarily by its continued poor per-
formance in food production. While wheat is
Figure 10—Increase in total demand for
major cereal commodities, 
1993–2020
Source:  IFPRI IMPACT simulations.
Figure 11—Annual growth in cereal yields,
1967–82, 1982–94, and 1993–2020
Source:  1967–82 and 1982–94: Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, FAOSTAT Database
<http://faostat.fao.org>, accessed March 1997; 1993–2020:
IFPRI IMPACT simulations.
Figure 12—Net cereal imports of major
developing regions, 1993 and 2020
Source:  IFPRI IMPACT simulations.13
expected to constitute the bulk of the devel-
oping world’s net cereal imports in 2020, the
share of maize is forecast to sharply increase
from 19 percent in 1993 to 27 percent pri-
marily because of the rapid increase in
demand for meat (Figure 13). Trade in rice is
forecast to remain negligible. With an almost
60 percent projected increase in net cereal
exports between 1993 and 2020, the United
States is expected to capture a large share
of the increased export market for cereals
(Figure 14). Australia is forecast to almost
double its net cereal exports during this peri-
od. It is also noteworthy that under the base-
line scenario, Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union are expected to shift
from being significant net cereal importers to
significant net exporters by 2020. 
With continued population growth, rapid
income growth, and changes in lifestyles,
demand for meat is expected to rise rapidly in
developing countries. IMPA C T p r o j e c t i o n s
indicate that total demand for meat will
increase by 2.9 percent per year during
1993–2020 in developing countries and by 
0.5 percent per year in developed countries.
Worldwide, demand for meat is projected to
increase by 1.8 percent per year, with demand
for poultry expected to increase fastest at an
annual rate of 2.1 percent, compared with 1.5
percent for beef. In per capita terms, demand
for meat products is projected to increase by
almost 50 percent in developing countries to
31 kilograms in 2020, and by 4 percent in
developed countries to 81 kilograms. In 1993,
developing countries accounted for 47 percent
of world meat demand; by 2020, they are 
projected to account for 63 percent. Meat 
production is expected to grow by 2.7 percent
per year in developing countries during
1993–2020 (compared with 5.9 percent during
1982–94) and by 0.8 percent in developed
countries (compared with 0.9 percent during
1 9 8 2 – 9 4 ) . Despite high rates of production
growth, developing countries as a group are
projected to increase their net meat imports
20-fold, reaching 11.5 million tons in 2020
(Figure 15). Latin America will continue to be 
a net exporter of meat, but Asia will switch
from being a small net exporter to a large net
i m p o r t e r. Beef is expected to constitute 46 
percent of the developing world’s net meat
imports in 2020, poultry 30 percent, pigmeat
13 percent, and sheep and goatmeat 11 
p e r c e n t .
Projections of future fish consumption
are scarce. IMPA C T does not include fish
because of data limitations. FAO projections
suggest that direct human consumption of
fish will increase from 75–80 million tons in
1994/95 to 110–120 million tons in 2010.1 0
Much of the increase in fish consumption is
projected to occur in East Asia and, to a less-
er extent, in North America and A u s t r a l i a .
Figure 13—Composition of net cereal imports
by developing countries, 1993 and
2 0 2 0
Source:  IFPRI IMPACT simulations.
Figure 14—Net cereal trade of developed
countries, 1993 and 2020
Source:  IFPRI IMPACT simulations.14
C h i n a ’s per capita consumption of fish is
predicted to double from 9.8 kilograms in
1990 to 20 kilograms in 2010, driven primari-
ly by income increases, and will be met
increasingly from aquaculture production. 
With sustainable production from the
w o r l d ’s natural fish stock at its limit, supplies
from capture fisheries have stabilized at
around 90 million tons after nearly three
decades of steady growth. Aquaculture, how-
e v e r, has become the fastest-growing food
production system in the world, with global
production increasing on average by more
than 11 percent annually between 1990 and
1 9 9 5 .11 The share of global fish production
contributed by aquaculture rose from 13 per-
cent to 19 percent in the period 1990–95.1 2
Real fish prices have remained relatively
stable since 1970, while real beef prices have
declined substantially and are now less than
one-third of the 1970 price. Some researchers
report an emerging consensus that real fish
prices are likely to rise by about 10 percent by
2 0 2 0 ,1 3 while IMPA C T projections suggest
that beef prices will decline by about 5 percent
between 1993 and 2020, implying a long-run
increase in the relative fish-beef price and
therefore major adjustments in the world mar-
kets for both fish and beef.
Net imports are a reflection of the gap
between production and market demand.
For many of the poor, the gap between food
production and human needs is likely to be
even wider than that between production
and demand, because many of these people
are priced out of the market, even at low
food prices, and are unable to exercise their
demand for needed food. The higher-income
developing countries, notably those of East
Asia, will be able to fill the gap between pro-
duction and demand through commercial
imports, but the poorer countries may be
forced to allocate foreign exchange to other
uses and thus might not be able to import
food in needed quantities. It is the latter
group of countries, including most of those in
Sub-Saharan Africa and some in Asia, that
will remain a challenge and require special
assistance to avert widespread hunger and
m a l n u t r i t i o n .
Rising Cereal Prices and 
Falling Cereal Stocks
Sharp increases in international wheat and
maize prices, along with significant reduc-
tions in global cereal stocks, have received
wide publicity and greatly excited concerns
about food security during the past two to
three years. Most of 1995 and the first half of
1996 were characterized by rising interna-
tional prices of wheat and maize (Figure 16).
The price of wheat peaked in May 1996 at
around US$260 per ton, 65 percent higher
than the price one year earlier and more
Figure 15—Net trade in meat by major
developing regions, 1993 and 2020
Source:  IFPRI IMPACT simulations.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND EMERGING ISSUES15
than double the price in May 1994. The price
of maize also peaked in May 1996 at around
US$200 per ton, almost twice the price pre-
vailing in May 1995 and May 1994. The run-
up in prices resulted from an unusual
combination of factors, including poor weath-
er in some major cereal-producing countries
such as Australia, Canada, and the United
States; policy-induced reductions in price
subsidies in Western Europe and North
America that diminished production and
stock-holding incentives; substantial draw-
downs in cereal stocks to compensate for
production shortfalls; significant declines in
food production in the former Soviet Union;
and adverse policies and weather combined
with accelerating demand for meat and feed-
grain in China.1 4 Between 1994/95 and
1995/96, global cereal production declined
by 3.0 percent to 1,728 million tons, driven
by a 9.6 percent reduction in production in
developed countries that was only partly off-
set by a slight increase in production in
developing countries (Table 1). At the same
time, global consumption of cereals out-
stripped production for the third year in a
r o w, considerably depleting stocks and con-
tributing to a rapid increase in prices. 
If fully transmitted to domestic markets,
these sharp increases in international cereal
prices could have boosted producer incomes
but hurt poor consumers in developing 
countries, given that many of them spend
more than half of their income on food.15
However, many governments took mea-
sures to offset price increases, usually
trade-related measures, including tariff
reductions and substitution with cheaper,
lower-quality cereal imports. An FAO study
of 30 developing countries found very low
price transmission between international
and domestic prices for cereals and noted
that domestic price increases were less
than world market price increases in the
majority of countries.16 An IFPRI study
reported that in 13 out of the 22 import-
dependent developing countries studied,
import bills rose less than they would have if
imports had continued through 1996 at their
1991–93 levels, suggesting that many coun-
tries reduced their cereal imports significant-
ly in response to higher international prices.
Some major cereal importers such as India
and Pakistan even became temporary net
exporters. Moreover, the cereal price
increases of 1995–96 were relatively mild
compared with those experienced during
the crisis of the early 1970s; at its peak, the
1996 wheat price was, in real terms, only
one-third of the peak price in 1974, while
the maize price was less than half of the
1974 peak price.17
Closely associated with the cereal price
increases of 1995–96 were substantial
reductions in global cereal stocks, which
reached a 20-year low of 258 million tons in
1995/96 (Figure 17). As a share of consump-
tion, global cereal stocks slipped to 14 per-
cent in 1995/96, well below the 17 percent
considered by FAO to provide the necessary
margin of safety for world food security.
Much of the drawdown in stocks occurred 
in the traditional exporting or stock-holding
countries (Table 1). Since then, stocks have
been gradually built up, but the ratio of
stocks to consumption remains below the 
17 percent minimum safe level. A d d i t i o n a l
analysis is needed to explore whether 17
percent is still necessary given the current
market conditions.
Figure 16—Average monthly wheat and maize
prices, 1994–97
Source:  World Bank, “Commodity Price Data Monthly
Series” (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, Commodity Policy
and Analysis Unit, various years).16
The rising cereal prices of 1995–96 were
a short-run phenomenon and not the begin-
ning of a permanent upswing in prices or the
forerunner to another world food crisis as
feared by some. With the rebound in cereal
production in 1996/97 and forecasts of fur-
ther increases in 1997/98, international
prices have started to decline once again.
The long-term trend is for cereal prices to
continue to decline, although at slower rates
than in the past. Real wheat prices will
decrease only slightly until 2010, maize
prices are expected to stagnate, and rice
prices are projected to increase (Figure 18).
After 2010, the continued fall in the rate of
population growth and the declining propen-
sity to consume cereals as incomes rise (that
is, declining income elasticity of demand for
cereals) will combine to reduce demand
growth, and cereal prices are projected to
Table 1—Cereal production, utilization, and stocks, 1993/94–1997/98
Source 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98a
(million tons)
Production
Developing countries 932 931 959 1,008 1,003
Developed countries 797 851 769 868 865
World 1,729 1,782 1,728 1,877 1,869
Utilization
Developing countries 1,017 1,049 1,080 1,106 1,117
Developed countries 747 752 716 741 750
World 1,764 1,801 1,796 1,847 1,867
Stocks
Developing countries 169 158 153 155 147
Developed countries 176 161 105 127 133
World 345 318 258 282 280
Stocks as % of world cereal consumption 19.1 17.7 14.0 15.1 14.9
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Food Outlook no. 7/8/9 (July/August/September 1997).
a Forecast.
Figure 17—World cereal stocks,
1 9 6 9 / 7 0 – 1 9 9 7 / 9 8
Source:  U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Grain: World
Markets and Trade,” Foreign Agricultural Service Circular
Series (Washington, D.C., various years).
Figure 18—Real world prices for cereals,
meats, and roots and tubers, 
1993, 2010, and 2020
Source:  IFPRI IMPACT simulations.17
drop by 11 percent between 2010 and 2020.
Meat prices are projected to decline by only 5
percent between 1993 and 2010, and there-
after by another 1 percent to 2020. Prices for
roots and tubers are expected to increase by
3 percent between 1993 and 2010 before
declining by 7 percent to 2020.
Concerns are growing that cereal prices
may be more volatile than in the past.1 8
Reduced stocks and uncertainties associat-
ed with developments in China and the for-
mer Soviet Union, among other factors,
could increase price instability. On the other
hand, market liberalization in developing
countries, policy reform in developed coun-
tries, and more consistent and transparent
stock-holding and trade policies will make
producers more responsive to price changes
and could reduce price instability. How these
factors play out will determine whether cere-
al prices will be more volatile in coming
years. In addition to price fluctuations in the
international market, many low-income food-
insecure developing countries suffer from
large domestic price fluctuations owing to
inadequate markets, poor roads and other
infrastructure, and inappropriate policies and
institutions. Even small changes in produc-
tion resulting from better or poorer growing
conditions may cause large fluctuations in
food prices. In Niger, for example, the price
of millet during August 1997 was significantly
higher than in August 1996 and almost dou-
ble the price in August 1995 (Figure 19).
Concerns about Feeding China
With one-fifth of the world’s population and
one of the fastest-growing and most rapidly
transforming economies in the world, China
has the potential to significantly affect global
food security depending on the extent of its
future demand for cereals, its capacity to
meet its needs through production, and the
degree to which it enters world markets to
satisfy its unmet needs.1 9 Concerns about
how China will meet its food requirements
escalated recently when China shifted from
being a minor net exporter of cereals in
1992–94 to a substantial net importer in
1995 (Figure 20). China has since returned
to past levels of virtual self-sufficiency in
grain, with small net cereal imports of 2–4
million tons annually. In any case, the con-
cerns arising from China’s shift to being a
net cereal importer in 1995 seem misplaced
given that China has been a net importer in
13 of the 18 years since 1980. 
Views on the size and dominance of
C h i n a ’s food economy in the 21st century
Figure 19—Millet prices in selected markets in
N i g e r
Source:  FEWS Bulletin (published for the U.S. Agency for
International Development), AFR/97-09, September 26,
1997.
Figure 20—China’s net trade in cereals, 
1 9 8 0 – 9 7
Source:  State Statistical Bureau of China, China’s Statistics
Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistical Press, various years);
U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Grain: World Markets and
Trade,” Foreign Agricultural Service Circular Series
(Washington, D.C., various years).18
vary widely, with some forecasting that
China will be a major cereal exporter2 0 a n d
others cautioning that China might become a
major cereal importer, if not the world’s
largest importer.2 1 I M PA C T projections indi-
cate that, in the baseline scenario, total cere-
al demand in China will increase by 42
percent, to 490 million tons, between 1993
and 2020, and cereal production by 31 per-
cent, to 449 million tons. At 41 million tons,
C h i n a ’s net cereal imports in 2020 would
represent 18 percent of the developing
w o r l d ’s projected net cereal imports. While
sizable, China’s projected imports are unlike-
ly to pose an intolerable burden on the glob-
al food situation. For meat, China’s
production is projected to almost keep up
with increases in demand. Ap r e d i c t e d
increase in demand of 132 percent between
1993 and 2020 would result in net imports of
only 0.3 million tons—3 percent of the devel-
oping world’s projected net imports in 2020. 
Alternative simulations suggest that only
with extraordinarily rapid income growth,
severe resource degradation, and failure to
invest in agriculture would China’s net cereal
imports increase substantially and have a
significant effect on world cereal prices.2 2
For instance, should there be no increase in
government investment in the agriculture
sector in China, cereal production could be
19 percent lower in 2020 relative to the
Table 2—China’s projected production, demand, and net trade of cereals and meat, 1993 and 2020,
various scenarios
Cereals Meat
Year/scenario Produc- Demand Net  World  Produc-  Demand Net  World 
tion tradea price tion tradea price
(million metric tons) (US$/ (million metric tons) (US$/
metric ton) metric ton)
1993 343.3 344.3 –0.9 164 39.4 38.6 0.9 1,576
2020
Baseline scenario 448.9 490.1 –41.1 147 89.0 89.4 –0.4 1,480
Zero increase in 
government investment 
in agriculture 362.9 448.2 –85.2 162 89.0 89.2 –0.2 1,486
5% annual increase in 
government investment 
in agriculture 572.8 541.6 31.2 131 90.4 91.1 –0.8 1,465
100% self-sufficiency 
in cereals 469.5 469.5 0.0 138 89.3 89.9 –0.5 1,461
95% self-sufficiency 
in cereals 457.2 481.8 –24.5 152 89.1 89.5 –0.4 1,476
Structural change in 
livestock sector without 
technical changeb 488.1 557.1 –69.0 162 100.4 125.0 –24.6 1,735
Structural change in 
livestock sector with 
technical changeb 447.8 474.1 –26.3 154 89.3 89.5 –0.2 1,718
Source: S. Fan and M. A. Sombilla, “China’s Food Supply and Demand in the 21st Century: Baseline Projections and
Policy Simulations,” paper prepared for the postconference workshop on “China’s Food Economy in the 21st Century”
at the American Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting, Toronto, Canada, July 31, 1997.
a Negative sign denotes net imports; positive sign denotes net exports.
b Structural change refers to the shift from backyard to commercial livestock production. Technical change refers to
more efficient feed use.19
baseline scenario (Table 2). This could lead
to net cereal imports of 85 million tons in
2020, more than double the volume forecast
in the baseline scenario, which would cause
world cereal prices to increase by 10 percent
relative to the baseline scenario. However,
should China increase its government
investment in agriculture by 5 percent annu-
ally in real terms, domestic production is
forecast to increase to 573 million tons in
2020, 28 percent higher than production lev-
els in the baseline scenario. In this scenario,
China would become a net exporter of as
much as 31 million tons of cereals in 2020,
easing pressure on world markets and caus-
ing prices to decline by 11 percent.
If the Chinese government adopts poli-
cies to promote the attainment of 100 per-
cent self-sufficiency in cereals, world cereal
prices are forecast to be 6 percent lower in
2020 relative to the baseline scenario.
C h i n a ’s cereal production would be higher
relative to the baseline scenario, while
demand would be lower (Table 2). By defini-
tion, there would be no net trade in cereals
under this scenario. And should the Chinese
government pursue a policy of 95 percent
s e l f - s u fficiency in cereals, world cereal
prices would only be slightly higher relative
to the baseline scenario.2 3
Expanded livestock production in China
will rely more on grain-based feed and less
on backyard foraging. If China were to
employ the same proportion of feed originat-
ing from cereals as that employed in com-
mercial farms in the United States, it is
projected that cereal demand would increase
by 14 percent in 2020 relative to the baseline
scenario. Net cereal imports would increase
to 69 million tons, almost 70 percent higher
than in the baseline scenario (Table 2), caus-
ing world cereal prices to increase by 10 per-
cent relative to the baseline scenario. More
n o t a b l y, China’s net meat imports are project-
ed to jump to 24.6 million tons in 2020, an
extraordinarily high level compared with the
baseline scenario. Consequently, world meat
prices are projected to be 17 percent higher
relative to the baseline. However, should the
structural transformation in the Chinese live-
stock sector be accompanied by technical
changes that promote efficiencies in animal
feed use, total cereal demand in 2020 is pro-
jected to be about 4 percent lower than in the
baseline scenario, while net cereal imports
would be 36 percent lower. Net meat imports
would be half the volume forecast in the
baseline scenario.
China is already a significant player in
world food markets and is likely to become
increasingly important. However, it does 
not represent a major threat to world food
markets. 
Rapid Growth and Structural Changes 
in Indian Diets
With a population of 930 million in 1995,
India is the second most populous country in
the world after China.2 4 Like China more
than a decade ago, India is in the midst of
major economic reform. If it succeeds,
incomes in India will rise much faster than
they have in recent decades, with profound
e ffects on food demand and food security. In
the baseline scenario, India is projected to
have an average annual economic growth
rate of 5.5 percent during 1993–2020. Wi t h
this growth rate, the number of malnourished
children is projected to decline from 76 mil-
lion in 1993 to 49 million in 2020, while the
proportion of children who are malnourished
is projected to decline from 60 percent to 43
percent. Daily per capita calorie availability is
projected to increase from around 2,400
calories to 2,780 calories. 
As incomes increase, will Indians greatly
increase their consumption of livestock prod-
ucts, or will they remain more or less vege-
tarian, as India’s history and cultural
traditions would suggest? Views are mixed.
In the baseline scenario, demand for live-
stock products is projected to increase by 4.6
million tons between 1993 and 2020 to 8.5
million tons (the corresponding increase in
meat demand in China is 51 million tons to
89 million tons in 2020). Given the extremely20
low initial levels of livestock consumption in
India, rapid growth in absolute demand for
livestock would require a dramatic change in
eating patterns. In a scenario modeling the
e ffects of such a change in Indian diets,
I n d i a ’s demand for meat products is forecast
to increase almost 10-fold from 3.8 million
tons in 1993 to 36.4 million tons in 2020. T h i s
increase in demand would have to be met
through trade, as meat production is not pro-
jected to increase beyond the 8.5 million tons
shown in the baseline scenario for 2020.
I n d i a ’s projected net meat imports of 28 mil-
lion tons under this scenario are a far cry
from the less than 0.5 million tons forecast in
the baseline scenario. This increase in Indian
net imports would increase world meat prices
by 21 percent in 2020 relative to the baseline
scenario and by 13 percent relative to 1993.
If India attempts to meet potentially large
increases in livestock demand through
domestic livestock production rather than
imports, thereby raising demand for feed
grain, implications for global livestock and
cereal trade and prices would be dramatically
d i fferent from those predicted by the scenario
that relies primarily on livestock imports to
meet demand. 
The Transition in Eastern Europe 
and the Former Soviet Union
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the associated
political changes in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union brought great promise
for rapid economic growth in that part of the
world. Many projected that food production
in a number of countries affected, including
Ukraine and the Russian Federation, would
expand rapidly and significantly, causing
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
to switch quickly from being net importers of
grain to being significant net exporters.2 5
Although net grain imports by the former
Soviet Union have fallen dramatically, this
optimistic scenario has not materialized.2 6
There is still a great deal of uncertainty
regarding future food production and
demand in those countries. 
Many of the countries of Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union have tremen-
dous agricultural potential that is as yet
underutilized. Appropriate changes in institu-
tions and policies (including property rights),
increased market and trade liberalization,
and investment in rural infrastructure could
result in rapid production increases, but such
changes have been extremely slow. For
example, grain production in Ukraine has
decreased sharply since the beginning of the
transition process from an annual average of
47.4 million tons during 1986–90 to 36.4 mil-
lion tons during 1991–96.2 7 The decline con-
tinues, and grain production fell to about 27
million tons in 1996. Appropriate institutions
and policies could turn Ukraine’s large grain
production potential into major exportable
surpluses. European Union (EU) member-
ship by some of the countries of Eastern
Europe could accelerate agricultural trans-
formation in these countries with resulting
expansions in food production.
I M PA C T ’s baseline scenario projects that
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
will become major net exporters of cereal by
2020, on the order of about 33 million tons.
Cereal production is projected to increase by
almost 40 percent between 1993 and 2020
to 341 million tons, while demand is project-
ed to increase by 12 percent to 308 million
tons. However, if incomes in Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union grow faster
than the baseline projection and crop pro-
ductivity increases at a slower pace than
forecast, these regions would remain net
importers. For example, with an increase in
income growth of 30 percent and a drop in
production growth of two-thirds, crop produc-
tion would increase by only 12 percent
between 1993 and 2020 to 278 million tons
while demand would increase to 304 million
tons, resulting in net cereal imports of 26 mil-
lion tons in 2020—a very different outcome.
Slow crop production in Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union could cause world
cereal prices to be higher in 2020 relative to
the baseline scenario. Changes in cereal
production and demand in Eastern Europe21
and the former Soviet Union can have signif-
icant effects on the world food situation, but
it would take very large declines in productiv-
ity growth in this region to dramatically drive
up cereal prices.
M a l t h u s ’s Shadow Waning 
in Sub-Saharan A f r i c a
Thomas Malthus’s basic argument was that
the world’s natural resources could not
assure expansions in food supply that would
match population growth. Region after
region has disproved his prediction, but in
Sub-Saharan Africa the population growth
rate has exceeded the rate of growth in food
production since the early 1970s and the
gap is widening, resulting in declining per
capita food production (Figure 21). Simple
extrapolations of the trends in population
and food production growth since 1961 show
a further increase in the gap between popu-
lation and food production. This is exactly
the gap predicted by Malthus.2 8 H o w e v e r,
several recent developments suggest that
M a l t h u s ’s shadow over Sub-Saharan A f r i c a
could finally be waning. 
First, Malthus’s predictions grossly
underestimated the potential of productivity-
increasing technology. Where such technol-
ogy has been effectively developed and
utilized, such as in Asia, food production has
expanded much faster than population. In
Sub-Saharan Africa, the potential of appro-
priate productivity-increasing technology has
yet to be realized. Maize yields for Africa and
Asia were virtually the same in 1961, but
since then they have tripled in Asia and quin-
tupled in China while they have remained
stagnant at around 1 ton per hectare in
A f r i c a .2 9 H o w e v e r, there are encouraging
signs that productivity-increasing technology
is beginning to accelerate yield growth of
African food crops. For example, the intro-
duction of improved maize varieties has
resulted in productivity increases in We s t
and Central Africa at rates as high as 4 per-
cent per year during the period 1983–92.3 0
Some countries have experienced particular-
ly high rates of growth in maize production
during this period, including Burkina Faso
(17.1 percent), Ghana (8.3 percent), and
Mali (7.5 percent), albeit starting from low
levels. 
Second, Sub-Saharan Africa is experi-
encing economic recovery. After a number of
years of low or negative growth, gross
domestic product (GDP) increased by 4.2
percent in 1995 and 4.8 percent in 1996 and
is forecast to increase by 4.8 percent in
1997 (Figure 22). With population growing
by about 3 percent per year, GDP per capita
will have increased for three consecutive
years for the first time in many years. T h e
economic recovery is widely shared, with 20
countries achieving a GDP growth rate of 5
percent or higher in 1996. Spurred partially
by favorable weather, agricultural growth is a
key contributor to the overall economic
r e c o v e r y. Cereal production in Southern
Africa, for instance, is estimated to have
increased by 68 percent in 1996.3 1
H o w e v e r, the economic recovery in Sub-
Saharan Africa is fragile. Some of the factors
that contributed to the recovery are short
term in nature and cannot be expected to
persist; these include the higher commodity
Figure 21—Actual and extrapolated
population and food production
indexes for Sub-Saharan Africa,
1961–2020
Source:  Data for 1961–96: Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, FAOSTAT database,
<http://faostat.fao.org> (accessed August and September
1997); extrapolations for 1997–2020: authors’ estimates.22
prices during 1994 and 1995 and the favor-
able weather conditions in 1996 that enabled
recovery from the effects of drought in 1994.
Other factors, such as policy reforms, an
improved macroeconomic environment, and
social and political stability, can have a more
lasting effect on economic growth, if properly
nurtured. Moreover, economic growth rates
will have to be substantially higher if they are
to make a dent in Sub-Saharan A f r i c a ’s
poverty; per capita incomes have fallen so
much that even if economic growth were to
continue at the current pace (about 5 percent
per year), it would still take at least a decade
to recover to the levels prevailing in 1980.3 2
If Malthus is to be proven wrong in Sub-
Saharan Africa, a much greater effort must
be made to ensure that farmers have access
to appropriate production technology and
that policies are conducive to expanded pro-
ductivity in staple food crops. Besides new
initiatives and expanded support for agricul-
tural development, more must also be done
to reduce population growth. Sub-Saharan
A f r i c a ’s annual population growth rate is pro-
jected to decline between 1993 and 2020
(Figure 23). Yet the number of people added
to the region’s population every year is 
projected to increase until at least 2020, a
consequence of the past high rates of pop-
ulation increase. Moreover, Sub-Saharan
A f r i c a ’s projected annual population growth
rate of 2.33 percent during 2015–2020 will
be more than double the growth rates in
other regions.3 3 Population growth of this
magnitude will severely constrain efforts to
increase income and improve welfare, while
at the same time it will greatly increase the
need for food.
Weather Fluctuations and 
Climate Change
With the resurgence of El Niño, a large-scale
abnormal warming of the sea surface off the
South American coast, major weather fluctu-
ations are under way or imminent in many
parts of the world. These weather fluctua-
tions could lead to sizable food production
shortfalls and deterioration in food security 
in many parts of the world. Many expect the
current El Niño to approach, if not surpass,
the last two major El Niños of 1982–83 and
1991–92 in severity. The 1982–83 El Niño
caused severe flooding in Latin A m e r i c a ,
droughts in parts of Asia, declines in fish
stocks, and other weather-related damage
estimated at over US$10 billion.3 4 T h e
1991–92 El Niño resulted in severe drought
in Southern Africa that caused cereal produc-
tion to drop by 60 percent or more in several
Figure 22—Annual growth rate of real gross
domestic product in Sub-Saharan
Africa, 1987–97
Source:  United Nations, World Economic and Social Survey
1997 (New York, 1997). 
Note: 1996 = preliminary, 1997 = forecast. Data do not
include Nigeria or South Africa.
Figure 23—Annual population change and
growth in Sub-Saharan Africa,
1950–2020
Source:  United Nations, World Population Prospects: The
1996 Revisions (New York, 1996). 
Note: Medium-variant projections for 1995–2020.23
countries, and imports and food aid had to
increase to meet more than half of the cereal
consumption in at least five countries.3 5
The current El Niño has caused a
warmer and earlier dry period in Central
America, hindering the development of crops
already in the ground and reducing the area
planted. El Niño’s effects are expected to
intensify between December 1997 and March
1998 and could affect Central A m e r i c a ’s
premier foreign exchange earner, coff e e ,
which will be in a critical flowering stage at
that time. In the Andean countries of South
America, floods in the north and excessively
dry conditions in the south may affect the
planting of the 1998 main season cereal
c r o p s .3 6 Rainfall may be significantly below
normal during the main rainy season in
South Africa, southern Mozambique, Lesotho,
and Swaziland.3 7 Indonesia, Papua New
Guinea, the Philippines, and Thailand are
currently gripped by their most severe
drought in several decades, which exacer-
bated recent forest fires in Indonesia and
cast a smoky haze over the entire region.3 8
Two-thirds of China is suffering from pro-
longed dry spells. Australia is in the midst of
a severe drought that could cut its wheat
harvest by more than 30 percent.3 9 Of course,
in other parts of the world, El Niño could
have positive effects on weather patterns
and correspondingly perhaps on agricultural
production. Nevertheless, El Niño adds a
major element of uncertainty to agricultural
production and livelihoods around the world.
And concerns are growing that El Niños may
become more frequent and more severe in
the future as a result of climate changes.
Although the trend of global warming is
becoming increasingly clear, its effects on
food production are still uncertain. Some
research suggests that growing conditions
will deteriorate in current tropical areas
(where many of the developing countries are
located) and improve in current temperate
areas (where many of the developed coun-
tries are located).4 0 H o w e v e r, effects on pro-
ductivity and production will occur over a
long period of time and will be very small in
any given year. Therefore, it is reasonable to
believe that policies and technologies can be
developed to effectively prevent or counter
the negative productivity effects of global
warming. Failure by the public sector to act,
and failure by the market and the private
sector to respond, could result in significant
long-terms effects on food supply. Such a
scenario might include reduced food produc-
tion in tropical and subtropical countries and
increased production in temperate countries.
Whether these opposing effects will cancel
each other out through expanded interna-
tional trade, with little or no effect on total
world food supply, is yet to be determined.
Growing Water Scarcity
Unless properly managed, fresh water may
well emerge as the key constraint to global
food production. While supplies of water are
adequate in the aggregate to meet demand
for the foreseeable future, water is poorly
distributed across countries, within countries,
and between seasons. And with a fixed
amount of renewable water resources to
meet the needs of a continually increasing
population, per capita water availability is
declining steadily. To d a y, 28 countries with a
total population exceeding 300 million peo-
ple face water stress;4 1 by 2025, their num-
ber could increase to about 50 countries with
a total population of about 3 billion people
(Figure 24).4 2
Demand for water will continue to grow
r a p i d l y. Since 1970, global demand for 
water has grown by 2.4 percent per year.4 3
Projections of water demand4 4 to 2020, con-
sistent with the food supply and demand
projections to 2020 from IMPA C T, indicate
that global water withdrawals will increase
by 35 percent between 1995 and 2020 to
reach 5,060 billion cubic meters. Developed
countries are projected to increase their
water withdrawals by 22 percent, more than
80 percent of the increase being for industri-
al uses (Figure 25). Developing countries
are projected to increase their withdrawals24
by 43 percent over the same period and to
experience a significant structural change in
their demand for water. The share of domes-
tic and industrial uses in their total water
demand is projected to double from 13 per-
cent in 1995 to 27 percent in 2020, reducing
the share for agricultural uses. 
Growth in irrigated area is projected to
slow significantly. Worldwide, irrigated area
is projected to grow at an average annual
rate of 0.6 percent per year during
1995–2020, less than half the annual growth
rate of 1.5 percent during 1982–93. In devel-
oped countries, irrigated area is projected to
increase by only 3 million hectares (Figure
26), at an annual rate of only 0.2 percent,
compared with 0.8 percent during 1982–93.
Irrigated area in developing countries is pro-
jected to increase by 37 million hectares to
227 million hectares in 2020, at an average
annual rate of 0.7 percent, far below the
growth rate of 1.7 percent during 1982–93.
The largest increase in irrigated area is
expected in India (17 million hectares); 
public investment in irrigation has remained
relatively strong and private investment in
tubewells has been rapid. Acreage under irri-
gation will remain very low in Sub-Saharan
Africa, despite a 50 percent increase to 7.4
million hectares in 2020. Simulations sug-
gest that increased investment in irrigation
can make a significant contribution to food
production growth in Sub-Saharan A f r i c a ,
although the amount of land under irrigation
and the potential area exploitable relative to
total crop area may not be large enough to
generate revolutionary increases in crop 
p r o d u c t i o n .4 5
The costs of developing new sources of
water are high and rising, and nontraditional
sources such as desalination, reuse of
w a s t e w a t e r, and water harvesting are unlike-
Figure 24—Countries experiencing water
stress, 1990 and 2025
Source:  Population Action International, Sustaining Water:
An Update (Washington, D.C., 1995).
Figure 25—Water withdrawals for domestic,
industrial, and agricultural uses,
1995 and 2020
Source:  M.W. Rosegrant, C. Ringler, and R.V. Gerpacio,
“Water and Land Resources and Global Food Supply,” paper
prepared for the 23rd International Conference of Agricul-
tural Economists, Sacramento, Calif., August 10–16, 1997.
Figure 26—Irrigated area in major regions,
1995 and 2020
Source:  M.W. Rosegrant, C. Ringler, and R.V. Gerpacio,
“Water and Land Resources and Global Food Supply,” paper
prepared for the 23rd International Conference of Agricul-
tural Economists, Sacramento, Calif., August 10–16, 1997.25
ly to add much to global water availability,
although they may be important in some
local or regional ecosystems. So how can
the rapid increases in water demand be
met? The rapidly growing domestic and
industrial demand for water will have to be
met from reduced use in the agriculture sec-
t o r, which is by far the largest water user,
accounting for 72 percent of global water
withdrawals and 87 percent of withdrawals in
developing countries in 1995.4 6 R e f o r m i n g
policies that have contributed to the wasteful
use of water offers considerable opportunity
to save water, improve efficiency of water
use, and boost crop output per unit of water.
Required policy reforms include establishing
secure water rights for users; decentralizing
and privatizing water management functions;
and setting incentives for water conserva-
tion, including markets in tradable water
rights, pricing reform and reduction in subsi-
dies, and effluent or pollution charges.4 7
Failure to address the gap between tighten-
ing supplies and increasing demand for
water could significantly slow growth in food
p r o d u c t i o n .
Declining Soil Fertility
Improved soil fertility is a critical component
of low-income countries’ drive to increase
sustainable agricultural production. Past and
current failures to replenish soil nutrients in
many countries must be rectified through the
balanced and efficient use of organic and
inorganic plant nutrients and through
improved soil management practices. 
Although some of the plant nutrient
requirements can be met through the appli-
cation of organic materials available on the
farm, or in the community, such materials
are insufficient to replenish the plant nutri-
ents removed from the soils and thus to fur-
ther expand crop yields. But the use of
chemical fertilizers has decreased worldwide
during the last few years, particularly in the
developed countries and in parts of A s i a .
Although reduced use of fertilizers is war-
ranted in some locations because of nega-
tive environmental effects, it is critical that
fertilizer use be expanded in countries where
soil fertility is low and a large share of the
population is food insecure. Fertilizer con-
sumption in these countries is generally low
because of high prices, insecure supplies,
and the greater risk associated with food
production in marginal areas. For example,
on average, fertilizer consumption in Sub-
Saharan Africa is about 14 kilograms per
hectare compared with about 200 kilograms
per hectare in East A s i a .4 8 Expanded use of
fertilizers in Sub-Saharan Africa will help
alleviate current production shortfalls as well
as serious land degradation. 
Between 1990 and 2020, global fertilizer
demand is forecast to grow by 1.2 percent
per year, a significantly lower rate than the
2.8 percent of the 1980s. Average annual
growth rates are projected to be about
1.8–2.4 percent in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. These rates will be inadequate to
meet nutrient requirements for food produc-
tion and resource conservation.4 9
In view of the size and seriousness of
the soil fertility problem in many low-income
countries, a cost-effective fertilizer sector
and policies providing incentives for farmers
and communities to implement soil fertility
programs are needed. Such policies should
focus on supporting agricultural research to
generate appropriate technology; clear long-
term property rights to land; access to credit,
improved crop varieties, water, and informa-
tion about effective and efficient fertilizer use
in various production systems; efficient and
e ffective markets for plant nutrients; and
investments in roads and rural transportation
systems. Of particular importance to main-
taining and enhancing soil fertility is the
adoption of integrated plant nutrient man-
agement (IPNM) practices. The goal of
IPNM is to integrate the use of natural and
human-made sources of plant nutrients to
increase agricultural productivity in an eff i-
cient and environmentally benign manner
without diminishing the productive capacity
of soil for present and future generations.26
Diminishing Food A i d
At 7.5 million tons, global food aid deliveries
in 1996 were less than half the 16.8 million
tons distributed just three years earlier and
the smallest volume delivered in more than a
decade. Preliminary indications are that food
aid deliveries during 1997 are likely to be the
same or even slightly lower than in 1996.
Changes in agricultural policies in North
America and the European Union, the imple-
mentation of the Uruguay Round trade
agreements, and changing geopolitical and
domestic concerns within donor countries
have contributed to diminished interest in
and support for food aid among donors,
especially the United States, which reduced
its food aid deliveries from over 10 million
tons in 1993 to less than 4 million tons in
1996. As Figure 27 shows, all regions, most
notably Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union, have experienced reductions
in food aid deliveries. In Sub-Saharan A f r i c a ,
food aid deliveries in 1996 reached their low-
est level since 1983. An increasingly higher
proportion of the reduced food aid is being
channeled through targeted relief operations
and development projects—60 percent in
1996 compared with 40 percent in 1990—
rather than through untargeted program
assistance, which does not target specific
beneficiaries but provides broad-based eco-
nomic support.5 0
The substantial reduction in food aid
deliveries, combined with the growing ten-
dency to channel food aid through relief
operations and development projects, has
disturbing implications for food security
unless other development assistance
increases. The need for aid to combat food
insecurity has not diminished. For instance,
29 countries are currently facing food emer-
gencies due to man-made or natural disas-
ters; of these, 17 are in Sub-Saharan
A f r i c a .5 1 M o r e o v e r, if the resurgence of El
Niño has consequences similar to those
experienced earlier, large volumes of food
aid may be required to meet the needs of
drought-stricken countries in parts of A f r i c a ,
especially in Southern Africa, which was hit
hard on the last few occasions. Food aid will
have an important role for some years, not
only in addressing humanitarian emergen-
cies but also in directing resources to many
of the world’s most vulnerable food-insecure
people to help them permanently escape
poverty and assure food security.5 2
Food aid has traditionally been driven
primarily by the availability of excess food
stocks in the United States, We s t e r n
Europe, and other countries with quantity-
related farm subsidies. As such stocks are
reduced, however, an increasing amount of
food aid will need to be purchased in the
market. Given the high transaction costs
usually associated with food aid, considera-
tion should be given to gradually replacing
program food aid with increasing cash assis-
tance for commercial food import. It is, of
course, not certain that surplus stocks will
continue to be low. According to a recent
European Commission study, continuation of
current farm policies could result in the rebuild-
i n g of large grain stocks during the next 10
years (Figure 28).5 3 Should the European
Union be enlarged by inclusion of Eastern
European countries and should these new
members be permitted to obtain the benefits
of existing common agricultural policies,
grain stocks may increase even faster.
Figure 27—Food aid deliveries to major
regions, 1991–96
Source:  World Food Programme, 1996 Food Aid Flows
(Rome, 1997).27
Declining Official Development Finance
Paralleling the rapid decline in food aid to
developing countries has been a notable
reduction in official development finance to
developing countries (Figure 29). In nominal
terms, official development finance has fallen
almost 40 percent between 1991 and 1996 to
US$41 billion. Between 1995 and 1996 alone,
o fficial development finance declined by
almost 25 percent. Of course, in real terms
the reduction is even sharper. While off i c i a l
development finance has been falling, net pri-
vate capital flows to developing countries
have been growing extraordinarily fast,
increasing more than fivefold between 1990
and 1996, from US$44 billion to US$244 bil-
lion. However, most of the private capital
flows have been directed to a handful of
countries in East Asia and Latin A m e r i c a .
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are all but
bypassed by these private flows—together
they received less than 10 percent of the net
private capital flows to the developing world in
1996—and remain dependent on shrinking
flows of international assistance. This has sig-
nificant implications for their capacity to
engage in broad-based and sustained eco-
nomic growth and thereby to improve their
prospects for food security. Agriculture has
been one of the sectors to suffer most from
the decline in international assistance to
developing countries. In real terms, external
assistance to developing-country agriculture
almost halved from a peak of US$19 billion in
1986 to US$10 billion in 1994 (Figure 30).
Trade Liberalization Issues
In response to the recent GAT T a g r e e m e n t
and structural adjustment programs, a large
number of developing countries have liberal-
ized foreign trade in food and agricultural
Figure 28—Total cereal stocks in the EU-15
(actual and projected), 1994/95–
2005/06
Source:  European Commission, “Long-Term Prospects:
Grains, Milk, and Meat Markets,” CAP 2000 Working
Document (Brussels, 1997).
Figure 29—Aggregate net long-term
resource flows to developing
countries, 1990–96
Source:  World Bank, Global Development Finance, vol. 1,
Analysis and Summary Tables (Washington, D.C., 1997).
Note: 1996 = preliminary.
Figure 30—External assistance to
agriculture, 1980–94 
Source:  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, Investment in Agriculture: Evolution and Prospects,
World Food Summit Technical Background Document 10
(Rome, 1996).28
commodities. Unfortunately, the opening up
of markets in developing countries has not
been matched by market openings in the
countries of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). T h i s
asymmetry in trade liberalization reduces
benefits to developing countries and may
make continued market liberalization under
these conditions unviable for them. While
preferential treatments are still in place for
specific quantities of certain commodities,
OECD countries have been reluctant to
open up their domestic markets for imports
from developing countries of high-value
commodities such as beef, sugar, ground-
nuts, and dairy products. At the same time,
developing countries are being encouraged
through structural adjustment to emphasize
production of these same high-value agricul-
tural commodities for export. From the point
of view of food security and poverty allevia-
tion in developing countries, the next round
of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotia-
tions should emphasize the opening up of
domestic markets in OECD countries for
commodities from developing countries.
To fully benefit from trade liberalization,
developing countries must invest in domestic
infrastructure, effective and efficient agricul-
tural input and output markets, research and
t e c h n o l o g y, and a more equitable distribution
of land and other productive resources.
Furthermore, while most poor and food-
insecure people are expected to benefit 
from trade liberalization, the distribution of
benefits will be determined largely by the
distribution of productive assets. Countries
with very skewed distribution of assets may
experience an amplification of this pattern 
as a result of trade liberalization. T h e r e f o r e ,
emphasis on trade liberalization should be
matched with similar or stronger emphasis
on rectifying domestic policies, including
improved access by the poor to productive
assets and employment.
Recent estimates indicate that the
impact of the Uruguay Round of GAT T o n
international food and agricultural prices will
be very limited indeed.5 4 It is estimated that
the Uruguay Round will result in price
increases for grains and livestock products
between 2 and 5 percent by the year 2005.
These small increases will not offset the
long-term declining trend in food prices.
Population Growth Slower Than Projected
R e c e n t l y, the United Nations again conclud-
ed that its earlier projections had overesti-
mated population growth. The actual annual
population growth rate between 1990 and
1995 was 1.48 percent rather than the 1.68
percent estimated in 1992 or the 1.57 per-
cent estimated in 1994.5 5 In light of this
development, the United Nations revised its
projections for population growth in the next
c e n t u r y. The annual rate of change in world
population during 2015–20 is now estimated
at 1.03 percent instead of 1.13 percent as
projected in 1992. Under the current medi-
um-variant estimates, the world’s population
is projected to reach 7.67 billion by 2020,
about 300 million less than had been pro-
jected in 1992 and 200 million less than 
had been projected in 1994. Clearly, should
these revised projections hold, pressure on
the world’s food supplies will be reduced.
Nevertheless, there are no grounds for 
complacency since even under the revised
medium-variant projections, the world’s pop-
ulation is projected to increase by about 2
billion people between 1995 and 2020.5 6
Escalating Concerns about Food Safety
and Genetic Engineering
The movement toward increasing food safe-
ty and consumption of organic foods pro-
duced without the use of chemical inputs
such as fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides
is strong in the developed countries. Related
to this movement is the possibility of rapid
increases in the desire for purely vegetarian
diets. IMPA C T projections do not eff e c t i v e l y
take into account an accelerated movement
toward organic food. In the short run, such a29
movement would result in sharp reductions
in agricultural productivity and food produc-
tion. In the longer run, some of the negative
productivity effects could be dealt with
through accelerated agricultural research
aimed at such issues as host-plant resis-
tance to pests, nitrogen fixation from the air,
and plants that are more efficient in extract-
ing and utilizing nutrients. An accelerated
movement toward vegetarian diets would, 
on the other hand, reduce the demand for
feedgrain and thereby reduce pressure on
future grain supplies. 
The current rate of increase in the
demand for organic food in Western Europe
and North America is likely to slow down in
response to higher relative prices for such
foods, and, while total demand will increase,
organic food is unlikely to be a major part of
total food consumed in these regions within
the next 25 years. However, public pressure
in Western Europe is likely to move govern-
ments to introduce legislation that will con-
strain or prohibit full use of the opportunities
o ffered by genetic engineering and other
tools of modern science for food production
and processing. There is a trend in several
European societies toward seeing the appli-
cation of science to agriculture as part of the
problem rather than part of the solution.
Combined with this view is a failure to appre-
ciate the need for productivity increases in
food production. While the application of
modern science, including genetic engineer-
ing and other biotechnology research, to
solving human health problems is applauded
and encouraged, there is an increasing sus-
picion that the application of such scientific
methods to food production and processing
will compromise agricultural production sys-
tems, food safety, and the health of current
and future generations. 
In fact, modern scientific methods, includ-
ing molecular biology–based methods, off e r
tremendous opportunities for expanding food
production, reducing risks in food production,
improving environmental protection, and
strengthening food marketing in developing
c o u n t r i e s .5 7 Tolerance to drought in selected
staple foods as well as resistance to other
adverse conditions such as insects, dis-
eases, and other pests could greatly increase
and stabilize food production and incomes
among small farmers in developing countries.
Should legislation constraining modern agri-
cultural science spread within the developed
countries, the consequences for long-term
food supplies in developing countries could
be severe, partly because of reduced exports
by developed countries and partly because
similar policies might be adopted in develop-
ing countries as well. 
Environmental and biosafety policies
may pose similar threats to food security.
Several countries have already implemented
legislation that will curb the use of chemicals
in agriculture, including chemical fertilizers
and pesticides. Environmental protection
legislation is also being introduced to regu-
late and curb animal production to avoid or
reduce air pollution, carbon dioxide buildup
in the atmosphere, and pollution of ground-
water and streams due to excessive or inap-
propriate use of animal manure on the land.
While some of this legislation can be justified
on environmental grounds, the short-run
e ffect is likely to be reduced food production.
In the longer run, the negative productivity
e ffects could be partially or totally eliminated
through agricultural research on pest-resistant
plants, use of animal manure for biogas, 
and other opportunities. Several developing
countries are currently reviewing their bio-
safety legislation as well as legislation related
to the use of biotechnology in food production
and processing, and the outcome of these
deliberations is far from clear. Developed
countries may also use food safety and bio-
safety policies to maintain barriers to imports
from developing countries. 
Misinformation and lack of information
on the potential environmental effects of the
use of chemicals in agriculture and on the
health effects of the use of genetically engi-
neered foods could significantly affect food
s u p p l y, demand, and therefore food security
for many millions of people in developing
countries. For example, failure to assist30
African farmers in getting access to econom-
ically viable plant nutrients, including organic
materials and inorganic fertilizers, because
of the perceived negative environmental
e ffects of fertilizers would make it almost
impossible for them to expand productivity
on the lands currently in production to the
level needed to assure food security in the
region. On the other hand, with the right poli-
cies for plant nutrients, agricultural research,
rural infrastructure, and agricultural markets,
African agriculture could accelerate its annu-
al growth rate from the current 2 percent to
at least 4 percent, while assuring sustaina b i l-
ity in the management of natural resources. 
Although it is critical that society estab-
lish ethics and social norms for the use of
results from scientific endeavor, it is impor-
tant that governments not be pushed by
vocal minorities and widespread misinforma-
tion to take the easy way out and simply out-
law all research results with unknown side
e ffects. A more enlightened approach
involves assessing the risks and opportuni-
ties and establishing sound biosafety rules
based on the best available scientific knowl-
edge. As part of such an enlightened
biosafety policy, societies should decide on
the extent to which consumers should be
permitted to make their own judgments
based on the best available information.
Genetically modified maize, soybeans, and
tomatoes as well as livestock products pro-
duced with the use of synthetic growth hor-
mones are cases in which society must
determine whether it wants the state to
judge for all or consumers to judge for them-
selves. The issues are far from resolved. For
example, the EU recently appealed the WTO ’s
conclusion that livestock products produced
with the use of synthetic growth hormones in
the United States could not be excluded
from the EU market on health grounds.
Conflicts and Food Security
Widespread local, national, and regional
instability and armed conflicts contribute to
the persistence of poverty, food insecurity,
and natural resource degradation. While
relief agencies around the world are fully
aware of the disastrous effects of conflicts
on peoples’ capacity to assure their food
s e c u r i t y, opportunities for preventing or
resolving conflict through improvements in
food security and more sustainable use of
natural resources have received little atten-
tion until recently. It is becoming increasingly
clear that poverty, food insecurity, and 
natural resource degradation contribute to
the initiation or prolongation of instability or
conflicts. Poor, food-insecure people may, in
desperate circumstances, perceive no option
but to engage in conflict to secure their
access to resources that will assure future
well-being. Of course, not all poor, food-
insecure people engage in conflict, but the
probability of instability or conflict rises in 
circumstances where people are pushed to
the limit to meet even their most fundamen-
tal needs. The complex, mutually reinforcing
relationship between poverty, food insecurity,
and natural resource degradation on the one
hand, and social and political instability and
conflict on the other hand, has not been fully
recognized or acknowledged. 
Yet, 57 percent of the countries consid-
ered by the United Nations to have low
human development (low life expectancies
at birth, low levels of education, and low
incomes) were gripped by conflict during
1990–95, compared with 14 percent of the
countries considered to have high human
development (high life expectancies at 
birth, high levels of education, and high
i n c o m e s ) .5 8 And more than half of the 17
Sub-Saharan African countries currently suf-
fering from food emergencies also suff e r
from civil strife or armed conflict.5 9 C o n f l i c t s
in countries such as Burundi and Rwanda
are frequently characterized as resulting
from tribal or political issues when, in fact,
the underlying or catalytic causes are natural
resource degradation, extreme poverty, and
widespread food insecurity. Such conflicts in
turn breed further food insecurity, poverty,
and natural resource degradation, continuing31
a vicious circle of hunger and instability.
Rural populations are frequently forced to
flee for their safety, leaving agricultural lands
uncultivated and crops and livestock untend-
ed. Animal herds are raided, crops are
burned, and productive assets are stolen.6 0
Conflicts disrupt traditional agricultural and
pastoral practices, thus exacerbating the
e ffects of weather fluctuations. Cattle herds
that frequently are a significant buffer or
safety net against the negative food security
e ffects of droughts are often reduced or
eliminated during conflicts. The widespread
use of land mines prohibits the use of much
agricultural land in a large number of low-
income countries.6 1 Conflicts also tend to
undermine trade between regions. 
Degradation of natural resources, food
i n s e c u r i t y, and conflict interact to cause rapid
increases in the number of refugees and dis-
placed persons, thereby aggravating both
the consumption and production sides of
food security. The number of international
refugees has increased 10-fold since 1974,
from about 2.4 million to 23 million in 1995.
In addition, an estimated 27 million people
are displaced within their home countries.6 2
Large-scale movements of refugees and dis-
placed persons interfere with production
activities, disrupt food markets, and place
severe pressures on local food supplies,
which, in turn, may further amplify tensions
and civil strife. Large inflows of refugees 
and displaced persons also increase pres-
sure on natural resources, often accelerating
local deforestation, soil erosion, and water
contamination and depletion.
The extent to which agricultural research
and improved technologies can alleviate
p o v e r t y, improve food security, and encour-
age sustainable use of natural resources will
depend greatly on the extent to which con-
flicts are avoided. At the same time, the
extent to which conflicts are avoided will
depend greatly on the extent to which pover-
ty is alleviated, food security is improved,
and sustainable use of natural resources is
encouraged. Technologies and policies
capable of improving food security will
decrease the probability of conflict. T h e
interaction between conflict and the impact
of agricultural research deserves more
attention from the research community.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND RESEARCH
D
uring the next 25 years, food production
will not keep pace with increases in
food demand in developing countries, and
an increasing share of their demand for
cereals and meat will have to be met
through imports from developed countries.
For those countries with the necessary for-
eign exchange, including the fast-growing
East Asian countries, this should not be
cause for alarm. However, many of the low-
income developing countries, including most
of those in Sub-Saharan Africa, may not be
able to generate the necessary foreign
exchange to fill the gap between food
demand and production through commercial
imports. These low-income, slower-growth
countries will also face a widening gap
between food needs and economic demand
because many poor people will lack the pur-
chasing power to fully meet their needs.
Greater risks and larger fluctuations in food
availability and prices will exacerbate the
precarious food security situation for poorer
people in low-income countries. Unless new
action is taken, the gap between food needs
and availability in many low-income coun-32
tries will widen, resulting in increasing food
i n s e c u r i t y, hunger, and malnutrition.
The actions needed are comprehensive-
ly described in action plans from the Wo r l d
Food Summit and IFPRI’s 2020 Vision initia-
t i v e .6 3 Although increasing price fluctuations
are expected in the world market, the most
recent projections confirm that the long-run
trend for world cereal and meat prices is
downward in real terms. However, real price
decreases will be limited over the next
10–15 years. Various factors described in
this report—unexpected cuts in public
investments in agricultural research, 
environmentally or food safety motivated
production restraints in developed and 
middle-income countries, adverse develop-
ments in China, Eastern Europe, or the for-
mer Soviet Union—could prove the price
projections wrong. 
The focus of agricultural research and
policy aimed at reduced poverty and food
insecurity should be on low-income develop-
ing countries, and particularly small-scale
farmers in those countries. Continued low
productivity in agriculture not only con-
tributes to food gaps in these countries, but
also prevents attainment of the broad-based
income growth and lower unit costs in food
production needed to help fill the gap and
improve food security. While efforts to
improve long-term productivity on small-
scale farms must be accelerated, more
emphasis must also be placed on research
and policy that will help farmers, communi-
ties, and governments better cope with
expected increases in risks resulting from
poor market integration, dysfunctional 
or poorly functioning markets, climatic 
fluctuations, and a host of other factors. 
All appropriate scientific tools, including
bioengineering, should be mobilized to help
solve the problems facing small-scale farm-
ers in developing countries. Current invest-
ments are extremely low and must be
e x p a n d e d .
The agricultural productivity increases
needed to lift the populations of low-income
developing countries out of poverty and food
insecurity without doing irreparable damage
to natural resources will be possible only if
appropriate government policies are pursued
and investments in the rural areas are
expanded. While the specific policy mea-
sures must be designed within each country,
low-income developing countries should
review their trade and macroeconomic poli-
cies as well as policies on water manage-
ment and allocation, property rights to land
and other natural resources, agricultural
input and output markets, income-earning
opportunities and social safety nets for low-
income families, rural infrastructure, rural
financial markets, and various other incen-
tives for small farmers, including those need-
ed to adjust to and benefit from further trade
liberalization. Governments should also
review their current allocation of public sec-
tor resources to primary education, health
care, agricultural research and extension,
rural infrastructure, and other public goods
needed to accelerate broad-based growth
within and outside agriculture. Developed
countries should consider reversing the
downward trend of official development
finance, particularly to the most vulnerable
developing countries. Failure to do the right
thing will result in continued low economic
growth and rapidly increasing food insecurity
and malnutrition in many low-income devel-
oping countries, forgone opportunities for
expanded international trade, widespread
conflict and civil strife, and an unstable 
world for all.33
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